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A. The objective
1. The challenge of making accurate short-term economic
forecasts can only be inadequately met by concentrating the
research on the analysis of short-term demand developments.
In order to recognize turning points as well as to detect
breaks in the trend, one has to also examine long-term deve-
lopments. It is especially important to comprehend influences
on the supply-side and their developments. However, it is
also important to include the pattern of reaction of policy-
... makers and economic agents on cyclical and long-term
phenomena.
2. The purpose of the analysis in scenario I, which incorporates
the probable economic policy, cannot be to derive recommenda-
tions capable of preventing certain adver.se developments.
Rather, scenario I outlines a probable overall economic deve-
lopment, which can be an input for those who require an
overall economic framework for individual economic planning.
3. The second scenario of economic development in the 1980's
assumes an optimum behavior (from the authors' viewpoint) of
economic policy and collective bargaining. With such a line
of conduct, adverse developments can be avoided - though not
in the short run.
4. It is not only because future priorities are unknown but
also because there will be unexpected future shocks, that a
scenario for the 1980's has not to be seen as a forecast in
the usual sense, i.e. a development that has a considerable
probability of being realized. Rather, scenarios are depicted
which have shown up consistently to the authors from the eco-
nomic and socio-political conditions in the beginning of this
decade. They may be regarded as a framework set up to make
the structure for future short-term forecasts a bit more
secure. However, they should not be fixed as a framework, but- 2 -
rather should be an impetus for a discussion of what may be
considered basic relations. . •
5. The 1970's were a decade of disappointment over the
Performance of the economic development. The disappointment
over the ineffectiveness of government and monetary inter-
vention in micro- and macroeconomic directions was extensive
and worldwide. The intellectual departure from interven-
tiohism in industrial structures and demand management was,
however, not (yet) accompanied by an actual abstention from
interventionism. Neo-conservatism in scientific and economic-
political programmatic scope has become more and more
fashionable. Within economic policy itself the new philosophy
so far only plays a limited role. , , ' \ • •
6. Because of this, one scenario was developed on-the basis
of a worldwide (also through wprld economic summits) syn-
chronous stop-and-go-policy. Specifically, monetary and
fiscal policy in the 1980's will, according to this. suppo-
sition, act on those economic and political aims which are .
at a given point in time violated mostly (price stabili.ty,
füll employment, growth rate, current account equilibrium).
This means, that policy-makers will continue to not take into
account existing side effects on other targets; thus, eco-
nomic policy will cause marked cyclical fluctuations in the
f uture, too. •• • . . .
7. A second scenario reflects the assumption that demand
management in the 1980's will be pursued in a way that
increasingly less prpduces or strengthens the cycle; i.e.
neo-conservative convictions will be carried through more and
more in monetary and fiscal policy, and finally in questions
of economic Organisation. Through.such an economic policy,
the,private sector would have.better foresight over future
• economic policy conditions;. ••• . ..- 3 -
B. Methodological remarks
8. "A trend is a trend is a trend
But the question is, will it bend?
Will it alter its course
Through some unforeseen force
And come to a premature end?"
9. According to a thesis from Knut Borchardt, the demand for
forecasts is then especially large when the actual develop-
ment runs otherwise than was generally expected, i.e. when
2
new knowledge and old expectations diverge . It is true,
however, that precisely in those times of the most intensive
demand for forecasts, the conditions for adequate forecasts
are relatively poor. For naturally, the forecaster cannot
forgo the use of past experiences, i.e. rnaking whatever
relations ascertained the basis of his judgement .
10.If the circumstances which Borchardt describes as the cause
for^problems in forecasting mirror reality, there is a con-
siderable need for forecasts now, above all for long-term
forecasts of economic development. Clearly, however, a fore-
cast of economic development to 1990 must be taken notice of
with inuch reservation and a necessary distance. Precisely
this should also hold true for this paper. For a coarse
assessment, many detailed findings gained in the scope of the




the Federal Republic of Germany can cnly be used in part or
Limerick (A. C. Cairncrcss, Essays in Economic Management,
2London, 1971, p. 139).
Cf. Knut Borchardt, Produktions- und Verwertungsbedingungen von
Langfristprognosen in historischer Perspektive, Allgemeines
-.Statistisches Archiv, 63. Band, 1979, Heft 1, p. 1-25, p. 8.
^Ibid -
Cf. Gerhard Fels, Klaus-Dieter Schmidt und Mitarbeiter, Die
deutsche Wirtschaft im Strukturwandel, Kieler Studien, Nr.
166, Tübingen, 1966.- 4 -
11. As in every forecast, the results are derived from specific
economic and demographical hypotheses which have not been
falsified as well as from certain application conditions.
Examples for such hypotheses are the relationship between
real wages and employment, the dependence of the labor
force participation rates of women on the development of
real wages, or the influence of the economic activity
abroad and the real exchange rate on German exports. In-
deed, the applied hypotheses are not always empirically
well secured. Frequently, they are not examined under
considerably variable conditions. If this qualification
is not true, then the hypotheses often are of limited
value, because considerable deviations between deduced
resülts and actual resülts were allowed in testing the
hypotheses. Only a few hypotheses fulfill those stringent
criteria, which are commonly used in or should be used in
regression analysis.
12. The hypotheses used are as a rule neither deterministic •'•'.
nor stochastic, but they only sätisfy the requirements
for a less strictly formulated methodological position of
Popper's critical rationalism . Deviations from the values
postulated in the respective hypothesis are permitted, as
long as "good reasons" for the appearance of the deviation
can be cited. Of course, there exists the danger that
ad-hoc explanations will be brought up. It was ättempted
not to succumb to this danger, but fully to keep to the
principles of critical rationalism.
13. Nevertheless the outlined approach is exposed to the
reproach of being "naive" or "unscientific"; there are
comprehensive econometric modeis, which can be utilized
Cf. Heinz Grohmann, Statistik im Dienste von Wirtschafts-
wissenschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik - Einige methodologische
Betrachtungen zu ihren Zielen und Möglichkeiten, Allgemeines
Statistisches-Archiv, 60. Band, Heft 3/4. 1976, S. 320-356.- 5 -
for the purpose of medium-term forecasts ..To bear in
mind, however, is that the evaluation chosen here may
just lead to "good" forecasts. Forecasts on the basis of
econometric modeis "can turn out to be an important help
in decision making, presuming that ^all essential
relations are included, and more, that no. changes in be-
havior occur or are expected.. If there are sharp changes,
as it presently seems to be the case (November 1975) ,
there are basically the same problems as with the
"intuitive" methods. In such a Situation, the forecaster,
who makes use of these methods, even has an advantage
over the econometrician, because he can more easily
2 discard the impediment of obsolete structures." .
14. In a forecast of the economic development to 1990, almost
all variables concerned are regarded as dependent on each
other. Only the population trend to 1990 may be fixed;
there may be some reservation even here, however, due to
the migration into and out of the Federäl Republic of
Germany. The interdependence is reinforced in scenario I,
because monetary and fiscal policy are seen as dependent
on price and employment developments. Nevertheless, the
approach chosen here consists in starting with some
variables and their relations in the interdependent System
and then analyzing the consequences for other variables
of the System. Thereby, conceptions over other endogenous
variables enter in, but it is possible that "implausible"
relationships result from the individual building blocks
of the forecast. In this case, revisions have to be made
of the previously set dependencies between the Single
variables.
Cf. Jürgen Blazejczak, Berliner Version des Bonner Modells
(Dokumentation), Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung,
„Berlin, May 1979.
Report of the German "Council of Economic Advisors",
Bundestagsdrucksache 7/4326,, November 24th,. 1975, p. 110,
translated by the authors.- 6 -
The described procedure was repeated until inconsistencies
were eliminated. While econometric multi-equation modeis
take into account the interdependence of the variables by
a simultaneous fixation of the coefficients, the approach
chose'n here can be characterized as an iterative procedure,
which incorporates pläusibility considerations in order
to match the general interdependence.
15. If such a procedure is used, it makes sense to start with
analyzing the relatively stable relations. Therefore, the
population trend is predicted first of all, so that with
the help of somewhat less stable relationships the labor
force can be forecast; thereby, the participation rate
is considered to be depending on the "net comparative ad-
vantage" of employraent in comparison to leisure time.
Thereafter, still less stable relations are used, in order
to derive further results. After having finished a "run",
multilateral relations are examined and if necessary, a
revision is made. Thereby, those "basic" hypotheses,
which could not be falsified despite of hard empirical
tests were maintained in any case; the medium-term
relation between money supply expansion and price level
development is an example. The modifications necessary
within an iterative procedure as a result of feedback
effects are minimized in the approach described.
16. Since some three years the authors regularly developed a
medium-term forecast on the economic development in the
Federal Republic of Germany. It turned out, that the
calculated lags between individual variables were often
longer than were expected. Also, the cyclical fluctuations
proved on the whole to be "drawn out." These experiences
were taken into consideration in' the article at hand. :
Nevertheless, the forecast findings are less meaningful
for single calendar years than for the cyclical course
of economic development in general.- 7 -
C. Scenarios for economic policy .
I. Basic conditions for the world economy
17. In 1981, the recessionary forces continued to predominate
in the industrial countries. Although there was a minor
increase in production on a year-to-year basis, the level
of capacity utilization decreased further. In all countries
the number of unemployed went up considerably. The rate
of inflation remained stubbornly high in spite of weak
demand. The widespread expectation that the economies
would recover swiftly after the last increase in oil
prices has been disappointed; in fact there are growing
signs that the recessionary tendencies could strengthen
' again.
The recession is persisting because central banks con-
tinued their restrictive policy in view of high wage and
price increases, not taking care of the warnings about
the dampening effects of such a restrictive stance on the
level of aggregäte demand. A raore suitable monetary
policy, oriented at the economy's productive potential
and aiming at a gradual reduction of the rate of
inflation in the face of wage and price inflexibility,
would have reduced the costs of decelerating inflation in
terms of foregone Output. "Such a strategy was clearly
considered by the economic aut.horit.ies in most countries
to be not very promising. Policy makers appear rather to
share the coriviction, that in order to break inflationary
expectations and to fester the necessary structural
adjustments, harsh monetary restriction is necessary.
The outlook for 1982 is'described in fnore detail in Adolf
Ahnefeld, Jcse Gutierrez-Camara, Joachim Streit und Norbert
Walter, Beharrliche Rezession in den Industrieländern, Die
Weltwirtschaft, 1981, Keft 2, p. 1-14.- 8 -
Production in the industriäl countries. in the irecent
recession has not gone down as rapidly as in the middle
of the seventies when a similarly large increase in the
price of oil and a similarly Sharp restrictive stance of
monetary policies met with a worldwide boom. In the
United States there was even.an increase of production
after the slümp of early 1980. This factor, taken together
with the high propensity to import of the OPEC countries,
provided the main reasons for the favourable export per-
formance of most Western European economies and Japan.
18. There are several signs indicating that this time the
recession in the industriäl countries will last longer
' thän in the middle of the seventies: '
• - During the 1975 recession an expansionary monetary
policy was quickly adopted; in most countries the
money supply was accelerating since early 1975. At
the same .time an expansionary fiscal policy was
carried out in order to stimulate. demand. Consequent-
ly, production in the industriäl countries by mid-
1976 already reached its prerecession level. But on
-the other hand not only the necessary structural
adjustments were postponed; moreover, the expansionary
"policies laid ground for a reacceleration-of inflation
. in the years after. • .
• - A fundamentally different picture characterizes the
present downswing. True, there was an increase in the
money supply from mid-1980 until early 1981; however,
in spring 1981, most central banks tightened up their
restrictive policy when the new U.S. goyernment gave
top priority to fighting inflation and the dollar
. strengthened drastically.. Also, unlike in 1975, the
possibility of further expanding the budget deficits
does not appear to be a viable alternative to
stimulating internal demand. On the whole, monetary
and fiscal policy are still restrictive at the. e'nd of
1981.- 9 -
This scenario gives reason to believe that in most in-
dustrial countries demand and production will once more
. go down during the winter 1981/82. This the.more so, when
one considers that the imports of the OPEC countries are
bound to turn weaker when the .oil. revenues in these
countries continue sinking. At this ,stage,'private
investment might be fully affected by the recession as a
result of a further decline in the level of capacity
utilization and also as a consequence of.exceptionally
low profits. If the firms were to maintain their level of
investment they would have to borrow heavily, an event
which appears unlikely when nominal interest rates
decrease only hesltantly and firms are confrorited with
increased difficulties in raising their prices. The'
.: sluggishness in the downward movementof interest. rates
is to a great extent due to the.widespread confusion con-
cerning the cyclical and structural components of-the
budget deficit; therefore every increase in public sector
borrov/ing requirements tends to be considered as a source
of future inflation.
19. Unemployment further increased in all industrial coun-
tries in the course of 1981. In this respect, Great Britain
has been with almost three million unemployed most severely
affected. The labour market Situation was not müch better
in Belgium, France arid Denmark. In the United States the
unemployment rate has again increased considerably in the
autumn 1981. Given the production outlook unemployment
rates in the industrial countries will reach record
past-war levels.
The inflationary tendencies in most industrial countries
during 1981 have lost relatively little momehtum in spite
of the f'act that monetary policy has been restrictive for
over two years. Only in Japan inflation faded quickly; in
the United States it also appears to have passed it's' peak.- 10 -
On the other hand, the Western European countries have
even registered an acceleration in their prices, raainly
brought about by an increäse of import priees as a con-
sequence of the strong dollar.
The expectation of a renewed drop in demand is bouhd to
have its effect upon the rate of inflation, as competition
in the markets can be expected to pick up in the face of
a further reduction in the level of capacity utilization.
A deceleration in inflation in Western Europe might also
be supported by the recent fall of the dollar.
20. It is to be assumed .that when inflation eases, the central
banks will loosen up their restrictive poliey. However,
judging from the official-.pronouncement in most" countries,
a rapid turnarourid - with a sharply increasing money supply
- should not be expected. Considering the usual.lags,
'deinand will .thus.not pick up before the second half of
1982. Moreover, it is doubtful that. the increäse in. pro-
duction will be strong enough to raise the level of
capacity utilization in 1982 already. The real gross
national product of the industrial countries in 1982 will
barely be higher than in the previous year. Under these
circumstanGes world trade might stagnate at the 1981 level.
21. Two scenarios are distinguished for- the econoraic poliey
in the second half of 1982 and thereafter. Scenario I
comprises a worldwide synchronously pursued stop-and-go
poliey acting on those economic poliey targets which,at a
given point in time have been missed most. Scenario II,
on the other hand, imputes that neo-conservative tendencies
will increasingly work their way into monetary and fiscal
poliey as well as into the poliey of organizing the frame-
work for economic behavior. The economic poliey scenarics
will only be quantified for the Federal Republic of Germany
using some indicators (money supply, interest rates, govern-
ment expenditures, etc.).- 11 -
22. The expectation of a worldwide synchronous economic policy
does not mean that economic policies will converge, i.e.
that .the Standards for the individual targets will converge
or even become the same. It is considered more probable,
that for the whole decade a divergence of inflation rates
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the rest of
the industrial countries will occur, which is comparable
to the inflation differentials of the 70's. This means
that the current discrepancy of more than 10 percentage
points will remain more or less unchanged.
23. Such an assessment implies that - are massive changes of
the international competitive position to be avoided -
appropriate exchange rate adjustments will happen. While
for the DM, compared to non EMS currencies, there are no
' principle cbstacles, a closer presumption is that the DM
does not have that freedom vis-a-vis the EMS currencies.
On the basis of the experiences with regional fixed ex-
change rate regimes in the 70's and on the fact that a
complete control of capital movements is neither probable
nor if introduced would be effective , it is expected
that competitively neutral DM revaluations in the EMS (if
itis not abolished) will not be decisively hindered despite
of institutional impediments for a DM-appreciation within
the EMS. Thus the real exchange rate (using the consumer
price index as a deflator) may remain unchanged in -the
80's. A nearly constant real exchange rate can be ascer-
2
tained for the last 20 years , too.
Cf. Norbert Walter, Kapitalverkehrskontrollen - ein Instru-
ment zur Regulierung der internationalen Kapitalströme?
2Die Weltwirtschaft, 1972, Heft 2, pages 154-180.
As to the reasons for deviations from the purchasing power
parity theory cf. Roland Vaubel, International Shifts in the
Demänd for Money, Their Effects on Exchange Rates and Price
Levels, arid Their Implications for the Preannouncement of
Monetary Expansion, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 116,
1980,' p. 1-44, here p. 9-11.- 12 -
24. Another reason to dispense with capital movement controls
lies, for all industrial countries, in the necessity to
finance the cürrent account deficit (affected by high oil
prices) through capital imports. Every apprehension that
a currency could become a "mousetrap" currency, is unde-
sired in view of suchf an intent. If, however, capital is
attracted to a free market through favorable conditions,
the simultaneous effect will be a relatively restrictive
economic policy. Thus the structural current account de-
ficit of the oil-consuming countries,' in addition to the
neo-conservative tendencies in these countries, repre-
sents a disciplinary factor for economic policy.
25. A possible third scenario, impressed by a relatively
steady policy in the Federal Republic of Germany with a
simultaneous continuation of the stop-and-go policy in
the other industrialized countries, is considered as im-
probable. The international influence on economic policy
is clearly determined by•the low costs of transfer of
inforrnation. Also, the marke'ts for the formulation of
economic policy are interwoven; this involvement has in-
creased even more after the institutionalization of the
so-called economic summits. If it were nevertheless to
~ come to'such a divergent economic policy constellation,
the results would be - in comparison to the probable
development (scenario I) - not so mueh medium-term
distinctions, but differences in the cyclical fluc-,
•tuations of the economic variables for the Federal
Republic of Germany; in the foreign exchange markets
considerably greater tensions would have had to be
 ;.
expected. •
26. The assumption, that protectionist measures will not ...
increase as a trend. in the 1980's, appears to be less
reliable. Apart from cyclical movements - in 1980/81 pro-
tectionism has already increased according to a report of
the IMF - there is a danger that the increasing laborBibliothek dm Instituts
-13- för Weltwirtschaft Kiel
supply together with an insufficient flexibility of real
wages will lead to rising unemployment in.many countries
and that there will be tendencies to .put up a block
against foreign competition. ,
27. Since in many industrial countries (excluding the U.S.)
the age-groups entering the labor force during the next
years are large in number, there is hardly any.limit for
higher rates of economic growth as to the supply side in
the labor market. In all industrial countries, hqwever,
the population growth has sharply decreased; in some
countries the population even declined. With this,
domestic demand - at least in some branches - will be
relatively v;eak. Since those countries in which the demo-
graphic development runs conversely (LDC's) hardly have a
financing margin for a demand expansion and since this
small ränge appears to be exhausted through oil price
increases, a worldwide dampening of growth rates is expected,
28. It seems to be clear, that in Order to solve the problems
in the 1980's there need to be new dimensions in economic
policy strategies. Especially importan.t is an integration
of OPEC-countries in the worldwide system of commodity
and capital markets and some progress in solving North-
South problems. A new dimension of Tripartite dialogues
has to replace the earlier fixation on small trilateral
Conferences between North America, Japan and Europe. The
industrial countries are only one group of participants
alongside OPEC countries and the developing countries.
Such a development will not occur soon and certainly not
without failures in the course of the process.
29. After a decline in relative energy prices because of the
recession an increase in the relative price of energy is
expected for the 1980's on the whole. Possibly, oil price
rises will coincide with.phases of economic boom and oil- 14 -•
suppliers will only be successful to some extent in
keeping the boom levels öf real oil prices during the
subsequent recessions. This relatively pessimistic assess-
ment is based on the strong impediments to the efforts of
industrial countries to reduce their dependency on OPEC
oil. These impediments exist for nearly all countries in
the area of nuclear power construction. These considera-
"tions, however, do not mean that a rise of the real oil
price comparable to the price increase since 1973 is
expected. I't is regarded as probable, that real oil prices
will increase frora the level of 1982 by approximately 3 %
per yeär on average. This rise is very much smaller than
the' average increase since 1973; the rate is similar to
the real interest rate expected for the 80's. A correlation
to the development of the real interest rate makes' sense
according to the theory of exhaustible resources .
30. lt- is not probable that the outlined problems for the
world economy in general are very much different for the
Federal Republic of Germany because of the regional inte-'
1
1 gratiorr of the EEC countries with Southern European coun-
2 •
tries . A slow progress. of Integration measures appears
evident, but there is also the fact that the joining
countries afe ha'rdly complernentary to the member coun-
tries, but m'ay contribute to an aggravation of existing
Problems e.g. in the agrarian market.
A rise in relative energy prices influehces the level and
the,rate of, expansion of the-productive capacity in the •
future; especially parts of the existing capital stock may
become economically obsolete. The development öf the
prcductive capacity may have an effect on the relative
energy price. These interrelations, however, can hardly be
„measured. -
As to the economic risks and chances of an EEC expansion cf.
Jürgen B. Donges and Klaus-Werner Schatz, Muster der indu-
striellen Arbeitsteilung im Rahmen einer erweiterten Euro-
päischen Gemeinschaft, Die Weltwirtschaft, 1980, Heft 1, "
p. 160-186.- 15 -
II. Economic policy in the Federal Republic of Germany
a) Monetary policy
31. It is expected that the German Central Bank will, as in
the past, set a high priority on fighting inflation. The
Bundesbank will not allow the inflation rate to substantial-
ly surpass 5 % over a longer time period. This forecast
is based on the experiences of the last 10 years. In 1973,
the inflation acceleration up to about 7 % induced a
drastically restrictive monetary policy. In the spring of
1979, an inflation rate of more than 5 % was the signal
for the Bundesbank tp switch from a policy of demand
Stimulation to a policy of fighting inflation.
32. On the other hand, if there is a low rate of inflation
and if the growth and employment targets are endangered,
the Bundesbank may, as in the past, pursue a policy of
demand Stimulation.,The most recent example of such a
behayiour is the easing of monetary policy in the summer
of 1977 and the subsequent expansive policy of 1978; the
unsatisfactory labor market Performance in the summer of
1977 and the strong DM appreciation with its undesired
economic effects on German exports caused the Bundesbank
to willingly overshoot the money supply target.
33. Monetary policy was pursued in a stop-and-gc-manner, even
though central bank money supply targets^were announced
since the middle 70's. After the experiences of the past
years it does not seem probable, that the Bundesbank
will, in the future, head for a definite moriey supply
target without any qüalificatiöns; it seems nearly
certain that interest rate and exchange rate targets will- 16 -
also play a role in monetary policy decisions . Since
these targets cannot be reached simultaneously and will
be achieved in different degrees, the money supply ex- •
pansion in the 80's will hardly be steady.
34. Öbservätions of the past can bring about a basic coricep-
ti'on of the mohey supply expansion in the f uture. The
average rate of expansion of the monetary aggregate M.. in
the 60's'came tö 7,5 % (Graph 1). The fluctuations in the
rate of expansion were, with the exception öf 1961/62 and
1966/67, relatively small - in any case smaller than in
the first'haJf of the 1970's when double digit rates in
1971-72 were followed by a sharp break in' 1973/74. In
19.75/76, there was ägain a strong monetary expansion
which was similar to the expansion in 1971/72.
35. The pattern of the early 70's can again be seen in the
last 5 years. This is surprising because money supply
targets were arinounced since 1974 and the intent was to
pursue a policy of steady monetary expansion. It should
be mentioned 'that the target was defined and announced
for central bank money, but the assessment of an unstable
money-supply growth alters little if one looks at the
development of the central bank money supply.
The Bundesbank vice-president says: "Which economic facts
should be used as a.basis when fixing the monetary growth
rate? Our answer to this question is pragmatic; that.is, it
depends on economic conditions at the time the target is
formuiated and those expected for the year ahead ... In
other words, we ... do not consider it possible to disregard
the pösition of the economy in the cycle and to release
monetary policy from its anticyclical function. On the other
hand, monetary policy must no longer see itself exclusively
as an instrument of anticyclical action: it must attach more
.importance than it used to to medium term aspects..." Cf.
Helmut Schlesinger, Recent experiences with monetary policy
in the Federal Republic of Germany, in: Beihefte zu Kredit
und Kapital, Heft 5, Inflation, ünemployment and Monetary
Control, edited by Karl Brunner and Manfred J.M. Neumann,
Berlin 1979, S. 303-320, hier S. 309-310.Graoh 1:
Money supply (MI)
V. change fröm previous year and 7« change on average
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Indeed, the fluctuations are smaller due to the "compre-
hensive" definition of the central bank money supply;
nevertheless, the average annual rates of change oscillate
between 6 % (1974) and 5 % (1980) on one hand, and more
than 11 % (1978) on the other. Therefore, one cannot justi-
fy the judgement that money supply expanded steadily sirice •
1975. The monetary policy in; recent years even has tp be
characterized as less stable than that of the 1960's. For
central bank money the average deviation (measured in
absolute terms) of the rates of change from the previous
year from the average rate of change comes to 1,1 for the
60's, 2,0 for the period 1970-74, and 1,5 for the period
1974-80. ;
36. Two different scenarios of monetary expansion are distin-
guished in the outlook for the 1980's (dependent on foreign
monetary policy). Scenario I is based on a monetary policy
reacting on the degree of realization of economic. policy
. goals by anti-cyclical measures (policy reaction function).
In Scenario II, a monetary policy is presumed, which aims
at a stable monetary expansion and thereby gradually reduces
the rate of monetary expansion in order to check inflation. ;
Concrete datä for both strategies as well as consistent
data on interest rates and exchange rates are presented
in the appendix (tables 1 and 10). The average rates of
change of M, for the years 1980-1990 come to approximately
6 % for scenario I (graph 1) and - with clearly smaller
fluctuations - to 4.5 % for scenario II.
b) Fiscal Policy
37. Government expenditures (central government, Länder, local
governme'nts, social insurance) expanded substantially
until the middle of the 70's (graph 2). The purchases of
goods and Services (in 1970 prices), i.e. government con-
sumption and government investment, increased duringGraph 2:
Government purchases of goods and Services plus government transfers'
% change from previous year and % change on average
1990
I i
In 1970 prices; transfers deflated by the private consumption deflator.-.20 -
1960-75 on the average by almost 5 % (table 2 in appendix).
This reflects the strong increase in expenditures for the
development of the infrastructure, for military purposes
and for health insurance purposes. The addition to the
personnel in public Service was important, too. The number
of employed in the gpvernment sector grew during 1960-75
at an annual average of 3,5 %, i.e. by a total of 1,4
million civil servants. In recent years, the expansion of
real government purchases has weakened considerably; the
increase for the period 1975-80 comes to 2,3 % on average
(2,5 % for government consumption and 1,3 % for investment)•
38. The same holds true for government transfers to the private
sector: High rates of increase in the period 1960-75 (7 %
on average; deflated by the private consumption deflator)
were followed in the years 1975-80 by a deceleration of
the expansion to an average of 3 % (table 2 in appendix).
39. In the next years, real government purchases will
probably increase only moderately. The high public de-
ficit, which is increasingly regarded as driving interest
rates and impeding economic growth, and the tendency
towards reducing the increase of public expenditures
support this supposition. For the same reason, government
transfers may expand less than in the past. Compared to
the second half of the 1970's, a deceleration of expendi-
tures is probable for another reason. More often than in
the past tax reliefs are expected in order to favor in-
centives to work and to invest and government will try to
limit the increase of the budget deficit resulting from
the tax reliefs.
40. In detail, it is considered probable that .the number of
employed in public service
pwill increase by 0,2 % per
year until 1985 and by 0,5 % per year from 1985 until
1990. For government purchases of goods an increase of- 21 -
2,5 % on average is expected. This results - with small
cyclical fluctuations - in an increase of government
consumption of 1,7 % p.a. in the first half of the 80 's
and 1,9 % p.a. in the second half. Even smaller rates are
probable for government investment. Due to changes in the
age structure of the population, a decline of real in-
vestment in the areas of Kindergärten and school and
university structures is expected. Compensatory measures
in the area of hospital construction, recreation
facilities and public road construction are expected to
be weak due to the strained financial Situation of the
government. This means, that the share of investment in
government expenditures will decline. A shrinking share
of investment is also due to the fact, that transfers may
increase more than real investment expenditures, despite
the expected cut of transfers to households in the form
of family allowances, unemployment compensations,
pensions, etc. and despite the cut of subsidies to firms.
The share of government expenditures in GNP may decline
from 46.5 % in 1980 to about 45 % in 1990; nevertheless
it would then remain seven percentage points above the
1970 level (graph 3) .
41. In scenario II for economic development until 1990, it is
assumed that government expenditures between 1980 and
1990 will - mainly as a result of more substantial cut's
;
in subsidies and transfers - increase by about one per-
centage point less than in scenario I. Also less fluc-
tuations in the rates of change are assumed for the
entire period (table 11 in appendix).
42. In taxation policy, too, scenario I and scenario II do
not differ as to the direction of the policy change, but
the change will be more pronounced in scenario II.
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Including social insurance- 23 -
decided upon in relatively Short intervals - somewhere
around 2 years. The income tax System is expected to be
adjusted in order to avoid increasing marginal tax rates
as a consequence of inflation. In both scenarios, it is
also expected - though in a different degree - that the
share of direct taxes will be reduced in favor of the
share of indirect taxes. Concretely, this means a lower
income tax, but higher rates in the net value-added tax
and in Special excise taxes.
c) 1980's - a revival of a policy of deregulation?
43. In the Federal Republic of Germany the question of
adequately organizing the economic System was debated
only in the short time period between the end of the war
and the formation of the republic. After that, through
Ludwig Erhard's courageous decisions as well as through
the constitution and the Bundesbank law, the market-
oriented framework for economic behaviour was established.
In the period following, it was neither further developed
nor decisively strayed away from. Important landmarks for
establishing a market economy were the passage of the
anti-trust law (1957) and the introduction of currency
convertibility (1958) and of floating exchange rates
(1971, respectively 1973). The Keynesian interlude intro-
duced with the Act to Promote Economic Stability and
Growth (1967) had not very much influence on economic
policy.
44. The detrimental macroeconomic effects of an Interventionist
policy with "good intentions" have meanwhile becorne clear
in many areas (housing construction policy, labor market
policy). Nevertheless, the following consideratiohs speak
against a strong revival of market oriented policy in the
80's: those groups marked by a distinct anti--market
economy attitude have become more articulate in recent- 24 -
years. Marxist, religious and environmentalist ideas have
joined with one another. This movement could attain in-
creasing importance because the present middle-part of
the age pyramide received their education in a time where
existential dangers were not discernable and because
ideological misdevelopments are not corrected. This has
especially affected the labor market. Equity considera-
tions were mounting and have led to a massive discrepancy
between domestic and foreign social compensations.
Working hours and working breaks, length of vacations,
health provisions, protection against firing and age of
retiring are much more comfortably regulated than inter-
nationally. There is not very much labor mobility between
professions and regions.
45. The challenge from those who enter the labor market in
the 80's will set off the closed-shop mentality of
management and labor. Even more, considering the financial
Situation of the government and the decreasing demand for
goods supplied by the government (education etc.) employ-
ment in public Service may clearly increase much slower
than in the past. Self-employment will appear inevitably
as an important alternative. The relation of dependent
workers to the total labor force may shift in fayor of
the self-employed. This may have an influence on economic
policy. A market oriented policy of deregulation, parti-
cularly with the existing displeasure with bureaucrats,
may be encouraged. There may be a more market-oriented
economic policy for another reason. Economic policy in
the U.S. has been basically reoriented, and it could be
tried, though with some restrictions, to imitate this
policy. As a whole, the market oriented policy will ex-
perience a certain renaissance in the 80's. This ought to
be true independent of which party or parties set govern-
ment policy.- 25 -
III. Collective Bargaining Behaviour
46. The wage settlements in the 80's, after being excessively
high in 1980 and 1981, may be increasingly characterized
by unioris
1 insight into macroeconomic relations. Consequent-
ly, the development will be more comparable to that of
the 50's and 60's than to that of the 70's. The demo-
graphical development, particulary the increasing labor
force capacity (until the middle of the second half of
the 1980's), and the currehtly high number of registered
and nonregistered unemployed reflect a relatively weak
bargaining position of the workers and the unions.
However, it can hardly be expected that in the coming
years firms will convert to labor intensive production
methods and thus intensify the demand for labor, since it
is known that the labor force will Start to decline again
around the end of the decade. The increase of real wages
will probably persistently be below - if only to a in
: limited extent - the increase of productivity, adjusted
for terms of trade effects.
47. There appears to be clearly less insight into the func-
tioning of markets with regard to the problem of adjusting
the real wage structure to the structure öf workers'
productivity. Some changes in relative effective wages
may occur, but not by deliberate wage differentiations in
wage settlements corresponding to the relative scarcities,
but by means of the wage drift in phases of economic up-
swings.
48. Unions' endeavors may be aimed less at shortening the
number of working hours than they were in the 70's. The
alternatives for a decision are expected to be more like
"maintainance of present real wages or more time off" and
less "increase of real wages or more leisure time," which
was an alternative only in the 60's and 70's. A real- 26 -
income that does not decline or moderately increases is
seen to be more attractive than more time off. In the
early 80's, however, there will be a limited decline in
,the number of working hours for some groups because of
longer vacations or as a result of early retirement. In
some branches, such settlements have already been decided
upon. The share of part-time workers may continue to in-
crease; some attempts to come to a " job-sharing" are e.x-
pected, too. The number of working hours per employee,
whether part-time or full-time, may therefore decline at
about the sarae rate as in the 1960's and the 1970's.
49. Within the framework of scenario I, wages per hour may
increase by 5,5 % on an average in the 80's. From 1970-
1980, the average rate of increase amounted to 8,6 %. To
bear in mind is that the rate of inflation in the 70's
was 5,1 %, while a rate of nearly 4 % is expected for the
80's on an average. Thus the real wage increase in the
course of the decade will be around two percentage points
less than in the 70's. Within the framework of scenario
II, a wage increase is implied, which comes out around
one percentage point less than in scenario I, in order to
provide from the side of the wage policy an adequate
contribution to the reduction of unemployment.- 27 -
D. Scenario I; Probable Development
I. Outlook for 1982
1:
50. In the course of 1981 the economic Situation in the Federal
Republic of Germany continued to worsen. With demand and
production stagnating, capacity utilization had already
decreased by fall to a level that was about 5 percentage
points lower than at the beginning of the recession in
early 1980. Concomitantly the Situation on the labor market
deteriorated substantially. By the end of 1981 the number
of unemployed is some 50 per cent higher than a year before.
The unemployment rate has reached 6.5 p.c. - a level which
had last been observed in the early fifties.
The downswing in 1981 was led by the pronounced weakness
of domestic deraand, as - contrary to all other postwar
recessions - private consumption declined sharply.
Investment in producer durable equipment which seemed to
be relatively robust in 1980, decreased as well. Only the
vigorous increase in exports - following a real depre-
ciation of the .D-Mark - prevented a marked.reduction of
real GNP.
51. Due to the continuing restrictive stance of monetary and
fiscal policy domestic demand is likely to decline further
in 1982. Likewise for foreign demand a downturn -most
probably towards the beginning of 1982 - seems to be
imminent. The economic development in many. industrial
countries has deteriorated perceivably and, ihaddition,
there is likely to be a reaction on advanced purchases
after the revaluation in the EMS. An endogenous inventory
accumulation as a reaction to the reduction of Stocks in
the course of 1981 is not likely. Continuing cost pressures
Cf. Alfred Boss, Günter Flemig, Enno Langfeldt, Peter Trapp
und Norbert Walter, Vor nochmaligem Produktionsrückgang, Die
Weltwirtschaft, 1981, Heft 2, p. 16-37.- 28 -
and unfavorable sales expectations will cause enterpr.ises
to keep Stocks at a low level. All in all, real GNP will
once more decline markedly. In view of the current ten-
dencies in world economic activity and in economic policy
a recovery can be expected in the second half of 1982 at
the earliest. For the year as a whole real GNP will de-
crease 1982 again by some 1 p.c.. Capacity utilization
will drop to the low level reached in the 1975 recession.
52. This forecast is based on the assumption that fiscal
• policy - in view of higher deficits - does not intensify
its pro-cyclical course, that wage increases are below
the expected inflation rate of some 4.5 p.c. and that
monetary policy allows the money supply to expand at a
rate which is oriented towards the growth rate of
Potential Output instead of focusing on interest rates in
order to achieve exchange-rate targets. In view of the
improvement in the foreign position - the strengthening
of the D-Mark, decreasing current account deficits and
declining interest rate in the United States - monetary
policy is likely to perceive room for a shift away from
its restrictive stance. However, in view of high wage
demands and inflation there is still resistance to accept
an increase in the budget deficit and to loosen monetary
brakes. Therefore, the risk is considerable that economic
• policy will not move to a less restrictive stance as early
as assumed, thus causing the downswing to be longer and
more pronounced. Not only are similar risks prevalent in
other industrial countries but, additionally, increasing
protectionism might hamper exports.
53. The appreciation of the D-Mark is likely to slow down
. inflationary impulses from abroad. Therefore, in 1982 the
dampening effects of the long lasting restrictive monetary
policy will predominate. The deceleration of inflation
will be hampered by fiscal measures. By the end of 1982
the current rate of increase in consumer prices will have- 29 -
been halved to some 3 p.c.. However, due to the overhang,
inflation will remain relatively high on a year-over-year
basis. The price increase will be about 4.5 p.c. in 1982
after scme 6 p. c. in 1981. At the end of 1982 the year-
on-year rate of change will be considerably below 4 p.c..
54. The ongoing recession in the first half of 1982 also means
that unemployment will increase further. Additionally, it
has.to be feared that in view of high inflation, wage in-
creases will be settled upon, that will not be low enough
to allow for an expansion in the nuraber of Jobs to absorb
. the unemployed and new entrants into the market. Because
employment is affected by production only with a lag,
unemployment will increase till the end of 1982 even if
the cyclical turning-point is reached in the second half
of 1982. During winter 1982/83 the nuraber of unemployed
will be above 2 millions.
55. In view of the unfavorable labor market development it is
urgently necessary to improve the conditions for a sustained
recovery of investment activity. Therefore, not only a
move towards a steady, medium-term oriented monetary policy
and a growth-stimulating fiscal policy are required., but
also modest wage settlements. To reduce unemployment and
to integrate the newcomers to the labor market the increase
in real wages has to be below the increase of productivity
- corrected for terms of trade effects - for a number of
years. As a first step a freeze of nominal wages should
be agreed upon. The Prolongation of cuirrent wage settle-
ments would be adequate given the unfavorable economic
development,t However, adjustment clauses should complement
the settlements, to allow for retroactive wage increases
if the rise of productivity and prices turns out to be
• higher than anticipated in the forecast.
The announced monetary target provides an expansion of
central bank money from the fourth quarter of 1981 to the
fourth .quarter of 1982 • in the ränge of 4 to, 7 p.c.. An- 30 -
expansion in the middle of the ränge seems to be in line
with a medium-term oriented course. However, the wide
ränge gives roora for an overly expansionary as well as
for a continuing restrictive course. Presently, the
Bundesbank strives for an expansion of central bank money
in the lower target ränge. According to the Bundesbank a
stronger monetary expansion depends on further progress
in reducing inflation and the current account deficit.
Due to these reservations economic agents remain uncertain
about the course of monetary policy. With the expected
decline in inflation and the current account deficit and
a mounting debate about high unemployment and weak growth
it is probable that the expansion of central bank money
will become overly expansionary in the course of 1982.
II. Medium-term outlook
a) Population and labor force
56. An outlock for the 1980's in the area of population deve-
lopment Stands on relatively solid ground. The expected
discrepancy between the available results of the population
extrapolations from the 1970 census and the results of
the population census (planned for 1983) pertains to the
level and less to the profile of the development of the
population in individual age groups or as a whole.
57. The population forecast is based on the forecast of the
Federal Statistical Office on the German population (in-
cluding immigration) until the year 1990. This forecast -
made in 1976 - has proved reliable as measured against
st the factual results for the German population on Dec. 31 ,
1978. The deviation between the actual and forecasted
data comes to 173,400 or 0.30% for the German population
as a whole (0.26 % for female and 0.35 % for male). The- 31 -
deviation turns out to be even less for the female and
male population between the ages of 15 and 65, i.e. for
those age groups which are most important for the calcu-
lation of labor force. A comparison of the forecast results
for individual age groups of male and female population
on Dec. 31
S , 1980 on actual figures is not possible as
data are not yet available. Comparing the forecast result
st and the actual data for the Overall population on Dec. 31 ,
1980, the forecast has still to be considered relatively
reliable. According to the results.of the extrapölation
(table 1) up to Jan. l
st, 1981, there were 57,089 million
Germans, 0.71 % (or 400.000 persons) more than was fore-
casted by the Federal Statistical Office. The error seems
to be related to persons 60 years of age or older due to
changes in the mortality rates.
58 ^ According to the forecast of the Federal Statistical Office ,
st the German population will decrease from Jan 1 , 1981
until Jan l
St, 1990 by 1.9 million, i-.e. around 210,000
persons or 0.38 % per year. The number of foreigners living
in Germany grew in recent years (table 1). A decisive
factor for this was an increase in net immigration. Accor-
2
ding to a forecast model , the number of foreigners will
increase by about 200.000 persons until 1990. The result
for total population will be an average decrease of
approximately 180.000 or 0.3 % per year until 1990. This
development is entirely different from that in the years
after the war until the middle 70's, when (from 1950-74)
the total population grew on the average by 0.2 % per
year. Yet, this means only a small acceleration of the
contraction process vis-ä-vis the average decline from
1974-80 of 0.13 % (graph 4).
Cf. Wilfried Linke, Charlotte Höhn, Voraussichtliche Bevöl-
kerungsentwicklung bis 1990, Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirt-
schaft und Statistik, 1975, Heft 12, p. 793-798, 1976, Heft
26, p. 337-340.
Cf. Modellrechnungen zur langfristigen natürlichen Bevöl-
kerungsentwicklung in Bund und Ländern, Band 1.Graph 4:
Population development
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Table 1: Population at the beginning of a year (millions)
Year German population Foreigners Total
according to















































59. The age structure of the population will- change drastical-
ly until 1990. Table 2 illustratos, that f-rorn -198 0 to
1990 a relative (and absolute) decrease of those under 20
years oi
: age, an increase of those' 20 years up to 65 years
and a decrease of those over age 65 will occur. Graph 5
shows the distribution of male and female population as
to the age groups on Jan. 1, 1978 and on Jan. 1, 1990. It
exhibits particularly the small basement of the age
pyramid in 1990.Graph 5:
Structure of the German population on January 1
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60. Despite shrinking total population, the labor förce ca-
pacity, i.e. those persons out of the total population
who by given economic and social conditions are able to
and want to work, may rise. The absolute-number of per-
sons between the äges of 15 to 65 will increase in the
years up to 1990. An increase in the age group of 20 to
60 years (German males) of around 827.000 persons is
expected; with females, there may be a decline of around
95.000 persons. Moreover, with some age groups of married
women, there will be - as in the past - an increasing
tendency to work. Countercurrent effects on other groups,
especially an influence of longer education time and of
! earlier retirement, are expected to be smallerv The >:•••••
participation rates of males in the middle äge-groüps are
expected to remain stable in the f orecast" period '.
Table 2: Shares of age groups in the German population at the










































Cf. Alfred Boss, Das Erwerbspersonenpotential in der Bundes-
republik Deutschland in den Jahren 1980 bis 1990; in: Institut
für Weltwirtschaft, Kieler Arbeitspapiere, Nr. 114, Januar 1981- 36 -
61. For married women, compared to the development of the
past 20 years, only an insignificant increase in the
participation rate is expected (graph 6). This is
considered probable, because the increase in real wages
rnay prove to be more moderate in comparison to the last
20 years. The fact that real wages are important in the
decision-making of individuals is reflected in the
development of the last years.. The flattening of,: the rise
of real wages was concurrent with a clearly slower
increase in the labor force participation rate of married
women .
62. The most important results of the forecast of the labor
force capacity are presented in Table 3 in th.e appendix.
Graph 7 shows the forecast figures for the German labor
force capacity as well as the numbers given by the Insti-
tut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung in Nürnberg
(IAB) in 1976 for the years 1961- 1990.
63. The supply of foreign labor declined after a strong in-
crease up to the middle 1970's but increased to about
2,4 million persons in most recent years. In the Coming
years the supply of foreign labor may change only slight-
ly due to a ban for the immigration of guest workers from
outside the EEC. Indeed, the foreign population in the
Federal Republic of.Germany will increase as a result of
family reunitings, through immigration from EEC countries
and through natural population movements (excess births
over deaths), but it will decline due to immigrants
returning to non-EEC countries. This overall tendency
will be overlapped by fluctuations following the business
cycle. • , . -
Cf. Alfred Boss, Die Erwerbstätigkeit verheirateter Frauen
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Erklärung und Prognose,
in: Beiträge zur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nr. 56,
Nürnberg 1981, p. 69-81.- 37 -
Graph 6:
Labor force participation rates of married women in varying age groups
50 up to 55 years
1960- 38 -
Graoh 7:
Labor force capacity according to the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und
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b) Capital stock and potential Output
64. The capital stock of the German economy grew from 1960 to
1970 on an annual average of 5.8 p.c. (table 3). In the
• . 7.0' s this rate declined to 4.3 p.c. . This was due to the
slow increase in investment in producer durables as well
as in construction (table 4). In fact, the first half
of the 70's is the phase of weak investment activity; the
second half shows a stabilization of investment activity.
The 5-year averages, however, are somewhat distorted be-
cause the capacity utilization rate in 1975 was lower
than in 1970 and 1980.
Table 3: Capital stock and potential Output
- % change on average
















It is doubtful whether the Federal Statistical Office's
results for the capital stock are sufficiently good
approximations of the capital stock that can be used
economically. Doubts are justified because of drastic
changes in relative factor and commodity prices. The
figures of the capital stock in the 80's are subject. to the
same kind of qualifications. Especially, the figures on the
level of the capital stock at the beginnig of the 80's may
comprise real capital that is econoinically obsolete.- 40 -
Table 4: Investment (in 1970 prices) - % changes on average
Period
Investment in Investment in








































65. In accordance with the development of the capital stock,
the growth of potential Output decelerated . After 4.5.
p.c. in the 60's, there was an average increase of 3.1
p.c. for the 70's (table 3).
 ! '
66. In order to forecast the development of the capital stock
and the potential qutput until 1990, it is necessary' to
assess the additions to the capital stock, i.e. investment.
Some considerations to this are presented in the section
on GNP and its components below. The results are shown in
table 4. The average rates of change for the capital
stock and potential Output in the period 1980 to 1990 are
approximately 3.5 p.c., respectively 2 p.c. (table 3)'.
This is a consequence of the procedure used in measuring
potential Output. As to the statistical details see Sachver-
ständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung, Jahresgutachten 1977/78, Bundestagsdrucksache,
8/122 vom 22. November 1977, p. 213-214, p. 216-218.- 41 -
c) Gross national product and the inflation rate
67. The expected monetary policy for the 80 's was described
above. Graph 8 illustrates the consequences of such a
policy for M, . According to Trapp the lag between changes
in the rate of expansion of M, and changes in the develop-
ment of economic activity, respectively price development,
amounts on average to some three to four quarters for the
economic activity and some 2 1/2 years for the price
development. Thus the main characteristics of the economic
development until mid 1982 are determined by the domestic
and foreign policy (especially monetary policy) already
set. Some details of the economic short-term outlook for
1982 are already described above.
68. On the basis of this development and the probable monetary
policy for 1982 and thereafter, the price Performance
plotted in graph 9 is expected (table 4 in appendix). The
inflation rate, measured by the change of the consumer
price index, will clearly decrease in the next years due
to the restrictive monetary policy of the recent years;
some 4.5. p.c. for 1982 and 3 p.c. for 1983 are probable.
In the course of the economic recovery in 1983/84, the
inflation rate v/ill - with the usual lag - increase to 4
p.c. and then decrease again to about 3 p.c.. After this,
the inflation rate is expected to increase to 4 p.c. as a
result of a new economic recovery. On the average for the
decade, the inflation rate will come to nearly 4 p.c. and
therefore will be higher than in the 1960's (2.5 p.c.)
but lower than in the 1970's (5 p.c.).
69. The basis of this appraisal of the future inflation rate
is the hypothesis that a permanent change of the rate
of monetary expansion, ceteris paribus, will lead to a
Cf. Peter Trapp, Geldmenge, Ausgaben und Preisanstieg in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Kieler Studien, Nr. 138, Tübin-
gen 1976, p. 143-144.- 42 -
Graph 8: .
Mohey supply (MI)
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change in the inflation rate. The adjustment will come
only with a lag after there has been a reaction of the
nominal demand for goods due to changes in relative
prices of financial and real assets. Additional influencing
factors (exchange rates and import prices, value-added
tax rate changes, etc.) are only s.ignificant as far as
they can lead to a short-term deviation from the trend
set by monetary policy .
70. Due to the expected terms-of-trade improvement the GNP
deflator may increase more than the deflator for domestic
demand in 1982/83. Since the terms of trade for the years
thereafter until the end of the decade are expected to be :
practically unchanged on average, the differences between
the rate of change for the GNP deflator and the deflator
for domestic demand are hardly worth mentioning (table 5
in the appendix).
71. The expected monetary policy together with the described
price development may lead to an economic recpvery at the
end of 1982. Real GNP may increase in the years 1983 and
1984 by 3-4 %, i.e. stronger than potential Output.
Facing increasing inflation rates for 1984,' the expected
onset of a restrictive monetary policy will check eco-
nomic activity. But the recession in 1985/86 may indeed
turn out relatively mild because economic policy mayibe
pursued not as much with anti-cyclical intentions as in :
the past. In the followin'g recovery, the GNP growth.rate
may again reach 3-4 % (graph 10). ( .
72. The results for economic activity in the 80's'are derived
from using a regression approach for domestic demand. The
independent variables in the regression equation are-
Cf. Reinhard Fürstenberg und Joachim Scheide, Ansätze zur
Inflationsprognose. Ein Beitrag über die voraussichtliche
Entwicklung in der Bundesrepublik, Kieler Arbeitspapiere,
Nr. 104, Kiel, Mai 1980, p.7-8, p.13-14.Graph 1o:
GNP (1970 prices)
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changes in the rate of expansion of M, and changes in the
inflation rate (measured by the deflator for domestic
demand). These variables explain the rate of change of
domestic demand both by their simultaneous values and by
their lagged values . The probable development of exports
and imports is added to the results for domestic demand
in order to arrive at a forecast for real GNP.
73. The forecast for real GNP' and.for the GNP deflator imply
an average increase of nominal GNP by about 6 p.c. in the
1980's, after 8.5 p.c. in the 1960's and 8.2 p.c. in the
1970's. Considering monetary policy as exogenous it is to
be examined whether the implications for the income velocity
are plausible. The income velocity will, ceteris paribus,
be high when nominal interest rates are high and vice
2
versa . The expectations on the development of nominal
interest rates are based on the hypothesis of a lagged
adjustment of nominal interest rates on the inflation
rate and on the expectation of a real interest rate in
the 1980's that is on average somewhat higher than it was
in the 1970's. A higher real rate of profit and a higher
real rate of interest are a reflex of the expectation of
depressed real wages and of repressed public Claims pn
Potential Output. Graph 11 shows that income velocity and
interest rates run in line with theory in the forecast
period. The yield on fixed-interest bearing securities is
used as a proxy for the three months' interbänk rate
(table 6 in the appendix).
Cf. Enno Langfeldt, Experiences in forecasting short-term
economic activity in the Federal Republic of Germany with a
single-equation regression model, unpublished paper, Kiel,
21981.
^As to -the determinants of money demand see Härmen Lehment
und Enno Langfeldt. Welche Bedeutung haben "Sonderfaktoren"
für die Erklärung der Geldnachfrage in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland? Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, -Band 116, 1980,
Heft 4, S. 669-684.Graph 11:
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d) GNP and its components
74. Private consumption is expected to increase less than GNP
in the 1980's. The reasons are a change in income
distribution in favor of profits and an increasing share
of households' expenditures for residential construction.
The inerease in the number of private households (table
5), especially the increasing share of households with a
Table 5: Private households by the age of the head of the
households and by the size of the household
Year
Age






















































households 4005 5544 6938 7691 8473
Several persons
households 15443 16466 15935 15610 15276
Total 19448 22009 22873 . 23301 23749
Ct. Federal Statistical Office, Wirtschaft und Statistik,
Heft 9, 1979, p. 649-651.- 49 -
head in the age of 50 years or younger, is expected to
lead to a relatively high demand for housing. Besides,
demand will shift towards high quality housing - though
in a weaker extent compared to the past. Finally, the
increase of relative energy prices is seen to induce
high investment expenditures of private households in
order to meet energy conservation or energy Substitution
targets; this should be true even if the relative energy
price decreases from the present exceptionally high
level.
75. Investment expenditures of thefirms probably will in-
crease by 4 p.c. on average until 1990. The reaspns are
the expectation of higher profits because of wage re-
straint, the monetary policy being, somewhat less erratic
compared to the past, the resulting smaller variance of
the inflation rate and the induced smaller degree of
investors
1 uncertainty as to potentiell rates of return
on Investment in real capital. in addition, tax policy
is expected to lead to improved incentives tp save and
to invest, e.g. by tax cuts in the field of the income
tax and the property tax, by increasing the share of the
VAT tax and the excise taxes or by improvements in the
field of depreciation allowances.
76. Investment in construetion will increase by 1.5 p.c. on
average until the end of. the decade;; the increase for
'. investment in producer durables and equipment is expected
to be sorae 4 p.c. on average, i.e. an increase which is
a bit raore favorable than in the 1970's, but somewhat
less favorable than in the 1960's (graph 12).
77. German exports are determined by the level of economic
activity abroad and by the relative competitive position
of German firms. In addition, there are influences on
the worldwide diyision of labor, e.g. .by changes in the- 50 -
Graph 12:
Investment in producer durables and construction (1970 prices)
7<> change from previous year and % change on average
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rates of tariffs. The development of world income (cf.
part C. I. of this paper), the expectation of a nearly
constant real exchange rate from mid 1982 to the end of
the decade and a - compared to the 1960's and the 19 70's
- decelerated increase in the rate of economic inte-
gration are foreseen to lead to an increase of German
exports by some 4 p.c. on average (graph 13). The
reasoning as to German imports is relatively similar to
what is expected for German exports (graph 13). The
elasticities of imports as to the development of GNP
plus imports are shown in. table 7 in the appendix.
78. A summary as tc real GNP and its components is given by
table 8 in the appendix.
e) Employment and productivity
79. The labor market Performance will be gloomy in the next
years. The probable stance of economic policy as well as
the sharply limited willingness of employers and unions
to take adequately into consideration the high level of
unemployment are expected to induce an only very slight-
ly increasing demanä for labor. Despite of downward
pressures on the real wages as a result of an increasing
labor supply and despite of the pressure on the partici-
pation rate of selected age groups, unemployment will
probably go up in the next years (graph 14) due to an
increasing labor supply concurrent with sharp constraints
on the flexibility of real wages. Only in the end of the
decade unemployment will decline and will be some 1 million
in 1990 (table 9 in the appendix).
The unemployment rate (measured by the ratio of the number
of unemployed to the number of persons employed including
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80. The expectation on the productivity development in the
1980's, especially the expected deceleration of the-in-
crease of labor productivity is important for the labor i
market results just described. Though it seems to be
correct that there is not any method of accurately fore-
casting labor productivity, some kind of a quantitative
assessment has to be made. The arguments following were
important in assessing the development of labor
productivity.
81. Productivity (per person employed) increased by 4.5 p.c.
on average in the 1960's and by 3 p.c. in the 1970's
(graph 15). The deceleration is due to a lot of effects.
82. The deceleration in the increase of the capital stock
during the 1970's seems to have been very important .
One reason for this may have been a crowding out of
private investment by public sector borrowing. Another
reason is the increase of relative energy prices
2 favoring labor intensive pröduction methods . Finally
inflation is an important source of reduced capital
formation. "First, higher rates of inflation tend to
reduce the purchasing power of fixed dollar depreciation
expenses which results in lower real cash returns in
future periods. Also, the U.S. tax System (the German
System as well, A.B. and N.W.) treats interest payments
made by firms as income to recipients and taxes it
accordingly. When interest rates rise to compensate
investors for the steady loss in purchasing power of
original sums lent to firms, these receipts - which are
necessary to maintain the real wealth of investors - are
Due to the higher relative energy prices the deceleration
may even have been more pronounced than is indicated by the
results of usual statistical measurement procedures. An
increase in the share of investment for pollution abatement
purposes is another argument in favor of a more pronounced
„deceleration.
John A. Tatom, Energy prices and capital formation, Natural
Resources Journal, October 1978, p. 877-897.7.
Graph 15:
GDP per person employed (1970 prices)




erroneously treated as income. Consequently, higher
before-tax real rates of return are required to compen-
sate for these taxes, further reducing incentives for
firms to raise investment funds. Finally, higher
inflation rates tend to increase uncertainty about the
future inflation rate. Consequently, investors and firms
view the cash flows expected from investment projects as
riskier and are more reluctant to invest" .
83. Apart from the weak capital formation the deceleration
of the increase of productivity in the 1970's is due to
a nearly stägnating share of research and development
(R+D) expenditures. In the 1960's the share of R+D
expenditures in GNP permanently increased. In the 1970's
the increase of R+D activities decelerated due to the
fact that the catching up process vis-ä-vis other
2
industrialized countries became less important .
84. To what extent the broader government regulations have
compelled the private sector to work more, thereby
hindering the increase in productivity is hard to .
determine. The same holds true for the qualitative
changes in the supply of labor - perhaps due to the
growing integration of women in the production process
during the 1970's.
85. There seem to be only weak reasons for being pessimistic
as to the development of productivity in the future,
Potential productivity may be large •, but some groups in
John A Tatom, The productivity problem, Review of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Vol. 61, No. 9, Septem-
2ber 1979, p. 8.
Gerhard Fels, Klaus-Dieter Schmidt und Mitarbeiter. Die
deutsche Wirtschaft im Strukturwandel, Kieler Studien,
3Nr. 166, Tübingen, S. 65-67.
Cf. K.-D. Schmidt, Das Produktivitätspotential der deut-
schen Wirtschaft, Die Weltwirtschaft, 1981,- Heft 1,
S. 56-73.- 57-
society seem to be inclined to vote against technological
changes and their consequences. In addition, most of the
factors which were influential in the 1970's will
continue to play a role, at least during the next five
years. However, some positive effects on productivity
are expected. One is the somewhat less erratic monetary
policy and its consequences on the inflation rate,
especially on the variability of the inflation rate.
Another is fiscal policy expected to lead. to more
incentives to invest than in the seventies. As a whole
productivity is foreseen to increase by 2 p.c. on
average in the 1980's; the development will be a bit
more favorable in the end of the 1980's (gräph 15).
86. The underutilization of the factors of production, which
result.s from the development described is pictured in
graph 16. Three different periods can be distinguished:
the years 1960-1973, the period 1975-1980 and the period
1982-1990. The years 1974 and 1981 cannot be clearly
classified, they are transition phases. The three time
periods can be differentiated, in that the level of the
unemployment rate at füll capacity utilization has grown
or will grow in the course of time. This can be inter-
preted as an increase of the "natural" rate of unemploy-
ment in the period 1975-1980 from 1 p.c. to 4 p.c. It is
expected, that the "natural" rate in the 1980's will
increase to 5 p.c.
f) Incöme distribution
87. The real wage increase per employed decreased from
5 1/2 p.c. in the 60's to around 3 1/2 p.c. in the 70's.
The rates for the nominal wage come to-8.5 p.c. änd 8.6.
p.c.. The rate of return on capital sank as a trend fromGraph 16:
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Deviation from
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capacity utilization
^Unemployed (including one-third of Short- time workers) as a percentage of labor force. -- 59
8 p.c. in 1960 to 5 p.c. in 1980 . This result is in
2 clear contrast to comparable results for the USA . In
the United States the rate has remained constant in the
last 20 years. The concrete value comes to.10.5 p.c. to
11 p.c. for corporate firms (excluding banks). Due to
the smaller rates of return in remaining areas (e.g.
agriculture), the rate for the total economy is somewhat
lower.
88. The wage share increased from 61-63 p.c. in the. 60's to
64-65 p.c. in the 70's (graph 17). The wage share
clearly decreased after hitting its highest level in
1974/75; it will nearly reach this peak level again in
the recession of 1981/82.
89. The wage share is expected to decrease somewhat in the
next years; the cyclical fluctuations will be similar to
those in the past. Towards the end of the decade, it
could almost fall back to the level of the years 1970/71
(graph 17). Real wages may increase by 1-1 1/2 on average.
With the expected develcpraent, the returns on capital
will increase somewhat.
90.. If one measures the real interest rate by the difference
between the yield on fixed interest securities and the
inflation rate of the same year (or alternatively, the
average inflation rate in the current and the previous
year), one obtains some 4 % for the 1960's and some 3 %
for the 1970's. The development outlined for the current
decade implies a somewhat higher real rate of interest
than in the 19 70's.
The rate of return is measured according to the procedure
used by the German "Council of Economic Advisors". The
procedure is similar to the method used by Feldstein and
Summers; cf. Martin Feldstein and Lawrence Summers, Is the
Rate of Profit Falling? Brookings Papers on Economic
2Activity, 1977, p. 211-228.








III. Concluding comments on scenario I
91. If the expected economic policy is realized and if the
hypotheses used are valid in the 1980's, then the deve-
lopment will be as outlined. The results may be very
disillusioning. However, it has to be taken into consi-
deration that the real GNP per capita is expected to in-
crease by nearly 2 1/2 p.c. for the 1980's as a whole.
In comparison to the 1970's (2.7 p.c.), this development
seems satisfactory; compared to the 1960's (3.7 p.c.)
the forecast implies a modest "deterioration" of some
I p.c.. More importantly, however, the development of
the 1980's can be influenced through economic and poli-
tical decisions and through changes in the behaviour
pattern of society. This is hardly true for the develop-
ment to the end of 1982. However, for the time there-
after it may be true to a considerable extent. Scenario
II outlines which economic policy and which behaviour
patterns of unions and firrns can bring about a more
favorable development. The probable results are presented
in the following section.
E. Scenario II; Economic development given optimal monetary
and fiscal policy and optimal behaviour of unions and
f irms
92. Scenario II describes a development for the 1980's which
could result if economic policy and management and labor
concentrate on those economic targets over which they
should have control in an adequate solution of the eco-
nomic policy assignment problem. Scenario II reflects
the assumption that demand management in the 1980's will
be pursued in a way that increasingly less produces or
strengthens the cycle; i.e. neo-conservative convictions
will be carried through more and more in monetary and
fiscal policy.- 62-
93. According to a similar monetary policy abroad, the Bun-
desbank is assumed to initiate a policy of stabilizing
the price level by announcing money-supply targets
without reservations and by simultaneously announcing a
step-by-step deceleration of monetary expansion in the
following years. M.. is considered to be the optimal
monetary target variable. M, is preferred to the central
bank money supply because it shows changes in monetary
policy impulses earlier than the central bank money
supply. The reason is that the demand for non-interest
bearing assets which are included in M.. , reacts directly
to a change in the rate of return on financial assets in
relation to the rate on real assets. Fluctuations in
economic activity, however, arise above all from such
shifts in the yields on assets. By choosing M, as a
target variable, monetary policy can stabilize the
economic development. This does not mean that there
would not be cyclical fluctuations any longer. Impulses
from economic policy shocks in the past as well as
shocks in the real sector of the economy will lead to
some cyclical fluctuations in the future, too.
94. In more detail, this means that monetary policy. turns to
a trend orientated course and permits a monetary expansion
of about 7 p.c. at annual rate in the'first year. After
1982, this rate of expansion should gradually be reduced
to 4-5 % in order to arrive at price stability in the
medium run. A stable monetary expansion by 4 to 5 p.c.
per year is sufficient to finance an increase of GNP at
a rate that is as high as the rate of increase of
Potential Output; at the same time, changes in the
efficiency of financial markets would have been
adequately taken into account.- 63 -
95. For the annual average change of M, , the monetary
expansion described means 5 p.c. for 1982 and 6.5 p.c.
for 1983. In 1984 the rate of change for M, would be
smaller than in 1983 (graph 18, table 10 appendix). The
course of monetary policy in scenario II means that the
inflation rate would be smaller than in scenario I
throughout the forecast period. It guarantees that a • •
stable price level will actually be achieved in the
medium run. Towards the end of the decade, .the rate of
inflation could well be zero.
96. On the fiscal policy side, scenario II assumes that
government expenditures (in 1970 prices) will increase
between 1980 to 1990 by about.1 p.c. less per year than
in scenario I (graph 19, table 11 appendix).
97. In scenario II, an increase'Of contractual wages is
assumed, which is around 1 percentage point per year
less than in scenario I, in order to have a larger con-
tribution from wage policy to reducing unemployment. The
(negative) difference between the increase of real wages
and the increase of distributable productiyity - which
itself will be higher - is larger than in scenario I.
Additionally, it is imputed in scenario II, that the
wage structure will adapt to the productivity structure
on a larger scale than in scenario I.
98. Finally scenario II purports a clearer determination in
favor of deregulation, e.g. in the fields of housing,
traffic, communication.
99. It is very difficult to deduce the consequences of the
economic policy and the behavior assumed in scenario II
since it is new in many respects. Above all it is difficult
to get an idea over the duration of the adjustment process
to the new structural conditions. The results presented
here may only give some hints at the probable implications
of scenario II.- 64 -
Graph
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Government purchases of goods and Services plus government transfers
0
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In 1970 prices; transfers deflated by the private consumption deflator.- 66 -
100. At the beginning of the forecast period, domestic
demand in scenario II would develop somewhat less
favorably than in scenario I as a result of the non-
expansive but trend-oriented monetary and fiscal policy.
In the medium run, however, economic growth would be
somewhat stronger and cyclical fluctuations would be
smaller than in scenario I. In the second half of the
1980's, the growth rate could corae to around 3 1/2 p.c.
per year which is approximately 1/2 p.c. per year more
than in scenario I (graph 20, table 12 in appendix). An
intensified investment activity in scenario II is decisive
for this difference (table 13, appendix). The inflation
rate would gradually decelerate and would tend to be
zero towards the end of the decade (graph 21). The labor
market Situation would become worse in the Coming years
(1982/83 around 1.7 million unemployed) in scenario II,
too. However, thereafter the development would be much
more favorable. As a consequence of the moderate wage
settlements and of the corrections in the wage structure
as well as of the steady economic policy, unemployment
would be reduced to around 1.3 million by the middle of
the decade. After that, a decrease to 0.5 million in
1990 would be possible due to a smaller increase of the
labor supply (graph 22, table 14 appendix).Graph 2o:
GNP (1970prices)
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Graph 22:
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1.9Table 3: Potential labor force (in 1000), Scenario I
Male
15 up to 30 years
30 up to 55 years
55 up to 60 years
60 up to 65 years
65 up to 70 years
Total
Female
15 up to 30 years
30 up to 45 years
45 up to 60 years
60 up to 65 years
65 up to 70 years
Total
Male and Pemale






























































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Deflators according to NIA and terms of trade




















































export unit values divided by index of import
•- 76 -






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1976 data according to the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung;
1990 data according to own calculations.- 80 -





















































xi average.- 81 -
Table 11: Government purchases of goods and Services and
government transfersj Scenario II - % change from





































































Table 12: Real GNP and GNP deflator, Scenario II












































Table 13: Real GNP and its components, Scenario II
























































































































Table 14: Number of unemployed in Scenario I
and Scenario II (in 1000)
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Unemployed
Scenario I
889
1265
1750
1540
1376
1578
1693
1458
1251
1052
941
Scenario II
889
1265
1750
1620
1420
1500
1300
1170
1040
750
490